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Adam Smith and Entangled Political Economy 




With this paper I suggest that Adam Smith would be more appropriately described as an entangled 
political economist rather than a traditional/orthodox political economist.   
Political economy is a term with a long history and a variety of meanings (Besley 2007). Today it 
seems to be limited to a relatively reductionist approach which tends either to maintain a strict 
division between politics and economics or to collapse politics into economics (more below). 
Alternative definitions and research programs are increasingly emerging to integrate, complement, or 
substitutes for the limits of today’s political economy. For example, Boettke and Lopez (2002) call 
for an integration of Public Choice and Austrian research programs to generate a “unification of 
social sciences on the foundation of a rational choice model” (112). Their approach is innovative 
and fruitful, but it seems limited to relax, at the same time, both the assumptions of benevolence (as 
Public Choice) and omniscience (as the Austrians) from traditional models. Boettke and Coyne 
(2003), focusing on the role of entrepreneurship, promote the role of institutions in understanding 
economic development. Yet they see a clean causal-relation between entrepreneurs and 
development, that entrepreneurs are not the cause of development but their consequence. Perssen 
and Tabellini (2004) expand the research agenda to include the effects of constitutions on economic 
performance and other economic policy outcomes. But here there is an analysis only of the 
unidirectional relationship between the constitution and the economy. And Besley (2007) goes as far 
as to call for a New Political Economy that resembles the original political economy of the 18th 
century. But his goal is to pick—picking institutions to implement and sustain good policies, as 
opposed to picking good policies. Picking institutions to achieve a preferred outcome implies a clear 
static causal relationship with no unintended consequences. 
While all these works contribute to the dismantlement of discipline barriers—barriers which can be 
quite useful in developing specialized knowledge but also can be quite limiting by preventing 
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communications and trade across disciplines—the idea of Entangled Political Economy takes the 
dismantlement of severed disciplines a step or two forward. The following section describes how 
Richard Wagner begins the exploration of Political Economy as an entanglement of policy and 
economy. Being entangled implies that a unidirectional casual-relationship becomes an ineffective 
explanation of social phenomena. It also implies that relaxing assumptions is necessary but not 
sufficient and that picking institutions becomes more challenging as institutions are constantly 
changing and often in unplanned directions.  
As shown in the third section, the idea of Entangled Political Economy is close to the concept of 
economics that Adam Smith presents, a concept which was not shaped by discipline barriers, which 
were still inexistent in the 18th century.    
Looking at how Adam Smith works within a system of entangled political economy is relevant not 
because of the authority he may impose on it, but because it is an additional example of the 
fruitfulness of the entangled approach compared to the traditional one. Adam Smith, indeed, 
analyzes the nature and causes of the wealth of nations by analyzing the interaction of the economy 
with politics, ethics, and the law. Similarly Smith presents each of these systems as a network of 
relations with all the other systems. Seeing Smith as an entangled political economist allows us to 
expand the domain of the analysis. In the subsections of the third part of the paper, we can 
therefore see how Smith contributes to the literature by offering an analysis of the entanglements of 
politics and economics when society faces a positive shock, integrating the current literature of 
entanglements of politics and economics during a negative shock. Additionally, Smith presents 
analyses of the entanglements of the economy not just with polity, but also with other systems of 
behaviors such as the law and morality. 
Concluding remarks end the paper suggesting that Adam Smith may therefore help expanding the 
horizon of the entangled political economy analysis and the explanatory powers of economics. And 
the more extensive the analysis, the more extensive is the call to rethink not just how we do political 
economy, but how we do economics in general. Thinking in terms of entangled political economy 
may improve our understanding of the economy, of the polity, and of human behavior in general.  
The entangled political economy approached proposed by Wagner is here taken as given. I 
superimpose Adam Smith to Wagner’s framework to expand its explanatory powers. Let us then 




Political Economy as political plus economy vs political entangled with economy 
Economics tends to isolate itself. In its worst moments, it abandons interactions with other social 
sciences, and forms self-contained structures. The idea that interactions with other disciplines should 
be avoided comes from the idea that these interactions could compromise its purity.  
On occasions, interdisciplinary contacts take the form of economic imperialism, where economics 
takes over other disciplines and dominates them rather than integrate with them. Or, when there are 
interdisciplinary bridges, they often are simply bridges, meaning that the two bridged disciplines 
remain separate and distinct. Political economy, for example can be described not necessarily as an 
integrated merger of the polity and the economy but rather as a connection, a going back and 
forward, between these two separate realms. Analyses in political economy are such that “market 
equilibrium is established theoretically prior to and independently of political action, with 
subsequent political intervention establishing an alternative equilibrium” (Smith, Wagner, and 
Yandle 2011, p. 46).  
Richard Wagner looks at the possibilities of an entangled political economy instead. Wagner 
recognizes that the analysis of the interactions of politics and economics in the traditional political 
economy is mostly like a bridge across two distinct and not permeable disciplines. As relevant and 
fruitful as it is, this analysis may be integrated with a different approach, increasing the explanatory 
power of the theory. Indeed “The conventional polarization between market and state leads 
theoretical thought astray by ignoring the ecological nature of human enterprise.  A society contains 
an entangled set of enterprises, some commercial and others political.  Those enterprises don’t 
operate independently of one another in separate ponds of activity.  They are entangled in a complex 
human ecology” (Wagner 2012 p. 125). 
For Wagner, the relation between politics and economics is not a one way street leading economics 
through politics. It is a complex network of reciprocal influences of economics and politics upon 
each other. It is an entangled and complex relation. To use his words: “Orthodox political economy 
pursues a sequential mode of analysis where people write the first draft of the manuscript of social 
life through their efforts in the precincts of market and civil society, with the state subsequently 
revising and polishing the manuscript.  The alternative, polycentric orientation leads to a coeval or 
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simultaneous mode of analysis, in which the manuscript of social life is generated through continual 
interaction among participants within the precincts of market, state, and civil society, as Eusepi and 
Wagner (forthcoming b) explore” (Wagner 2012 p. 130). 
Thus, within an analysis, the dominant tendency is often to go from economy to polity, or in general 
from the economy to another system of behavior, to analyze how the economy affects the other 
system. Analyses going in the opposite direction, how other systems may affect the economy, are 
also possible but not as frequently offered. While the traditional political economy approach reflects 
these tendencies, “In contrast, our framework of entangled and simultaneous political economy, as 
sketched in (Wagner 2006; Wagner 2007), highlights a third possible option: the recent disturbance 
is a systemic feature of a constitutional system of entangled political economy” (Smith, Wagner, and 
Yandle 2011, p. 46), meaning that it is a continuous and complex interactions between the polity and 
the economy generate changes.  
Another consequence of the adoption of the entangled view of political economy is the realization 
that the consequences of these changes are, often unpredictable, and often unintentional. The 
consequences of human actions may not always be intentional. This sounds, misleadingly, like a half-
new point mostly because economists are generally accustomed to the idea of unintended 
consequences. Yet, As Wagner (2012) reminds us, this approach seems to be limited to economic 
rather than expand also to political economy. Indeed, in our traditional analysis of political economy, 
we generally think that the outcome of a political action is the result of a specific plan and intended 
consequences. This is a different approach from our general understanding of economic actions 
having a purpose for the individual actor but not an intended social outcome. So, while we are 
comfortable to work within a framework of “result of human action but not human design” in 
economics, there is a tendency to adopt a “result of human action and human design” approach 
while we analyze polities and results in traditional political economy.  
But as Wagner points out for us, entangled political economy, on the other hand, allows us to be 
consistent and use the same approach we use in economics also in political economy. Within an 
entangled political economy analysis, policy outcomes may very well be the “result of human action 
but not the execution of any human design” (Ferguson [1767] 1995, p. 119).  So, within a traditional 
political economy approach “The theoretical antinomy results because political phenomena are 
treated as simple products of choice while economic phenomena are treated as complex products of 
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systemic interaction. To speak of systemic interaction is necessarily to speak of an order of 
organizations that is not reducible to some point-mass entity, other than by postulating that all 
observations pertain to equilibrium states. In contrast, the research program pursued here seeks to 
dissolve this antinomy by treating polity from the same scholarly orientation as economists treat 
economy.  As an order, polity contains many organizations within its precincts, and with those 
organizations interacting both among themselves and with various organizations located within 
economy. While all organizations are oriented teleologically through plans, the resulting order 
emerges spontaneously through interaction among participants.  Within polity there is no one 
organization that denotes polity, for polity is plural and not singular with respect to its organizational 
pattern” (Wagner 2012 p . 122). 
The analyses of entangled political economy may therefore not necessarily be elegant linear models 
but rather complex representations of a network of interactions with higher explanatory power of 
reality. When approaching economics and politics with an entangled political economy angle, 
therefore, contextualization becomes central. An economic principle in a vacuum is fundamental to 
its own understanding. But to understand its actual functioning, we need to generate a situation 
where the principle is at work, which is to say, when it interacts with other systems of behavior and 
when it is permeable to other systems of knowledge. 
This, in my understanding of Wagner, implies at least two things. First, in general, that the economic 
system generates a complex series of networks with all other systems, and the analysis of this 
complexity of networks and feedbacks allows for a deeper and more complete understanding of 
human actions compared to a more isolationist, linear, or unidirectional approach. Second, in 
particular, that within the analysis of the economy entangled with politics and other systems such as 
the law, morals, and science and technology, the focus should expand and include not only the 
interactions starting from the economy onto the other spheres, but also the interactions that have 
effects on the economy even if they originate elsewhere. 
The appeal of entangled political economy, with both of these aspects, may be testified not just by 
the recent work of Wagner and his co-authors, but also by the long-lasting appeal of the work of 
Adam Smith, the 18th century Scottish father of our discipline. Smith is still marveled at and studied 
today because of the complexity and depth of his analysis. And his analysis is indeed not an 
imposition of a bridge between economics and politics as spheres of human conducts independent 
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from each other, or a link between the otherwise disconnected market and state, but an analysis of 
the complex network of relations between economics, politics, ethics, customs, law, and institutions. 
Smith indeed writes before disciplinary boundaries are neatly defined, when moral philosophy 
covered all of the contemporary social sciences and the study of one aspect of social life in isolation 
would not have been an obvious approach to take. Smith’s analysis does not always start from the 
economy to end up into polity, but it also describes the complex web of interrelation of polity and 
economy. Furthermore, the economy is not entangled only with polity, but also with the law, and 
morals. And the results of these kinds of human actions are more often than not unintended.  
Smith’s political economy is entangled political economy. 
Adam Smith, indeed, analyzes the nature and causes of the wealth of nations by having a multiplicity 
of sources of motivation interacting with one other. The economy is always contextualized and it 
interacts with politics, ethics, and the law. Similarly each of these systems is presented as a network 
of relations with all the other systems. Studying how Adam Smith uses an entangled political 
economy approach helps us see how this approach can expand to several different spheres of 
human behavior: not just used for the entanglements of economics and politics, but also their 
entanglement with the law, morals, and science. If we take Smith seriously, therefore, we can use 
him to extend Wagner’s analysis and we can use Wagner’s analysis to better understand Smith’s.  
 
Adam Smith 
Let us now see how Adam Smith not only uses an entangled framework similar to the one that 
Richard Wagner describes, but that Smith also expands it and enriches it so that our understanding 
of human behavior may be more comprehensive. For the sake of simplicity I limit myself to the 
Smith’s analysis in some parts of the Wealth of Nations (WN) (Smith [1776] 1981). I use The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (TMS) (Smith [1759] 1984) and the Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ) (Smith [1762-3, 1766] 
1982) only sporadically and instrumentally and non-systematically. The inclusion of The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (and of the Lectures on Jurisprudence) is an additional step that would corroborate the 
current analysis and increase the emphasis of how entangled human behavior is, but at this point 
would excessively complicate the analysis. 
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Following my understanding of Wagner’s analysis, I point out how Smith explores the 
entanglements of the economy with the polity, and how the results of the complex nexus of 
relations between the polity and the economy may generate unintended results. While Wagner uses a 
negative shock to exemplify the extent of the knotted relations between polity and economy, Smith 
uses a positive shock.  Additionally, Adam Smith seems to use the method that Wagner describes in 
a more extensive way than Wagner does at the moment. For Smith, the economy is entangled not 
just with the polity, but also with the law and with morality. And it is the interactions of all these 
nexuses that characterize human society.  
I offer a couple of examples to explain how I see Adam Smith as an entangled political economist 
and how I see him as expanding entangled political economy analysis. I start by showing how in 
Smith the economy and the state are entangled, and how they are entangled in such a complex way 
to generate outcomes that none intended. I use the positive shock of the discovery of the New 
World. I then show how the economy and the law are entangled: the economy shapes the law just as 
the law shapes the economy. Similarly, I show how in Smith economy and morality are entangled, 
that is, how the economic affects moral just as much as the moral affects the economic.  
 
Smith’s Invisible Hand as a Wagner’s Marina 
The first thing I would like to notice in fleshing out the entangled relations between politics and 
economics is the lack of independence of market and state in Smith. As Wagner points out, 
traditional political economy draws a bridge between two distinct spheres of behavior, while 
entangled political economy see these two spheres in continuous and porous interaction as testified 
by the complex nexus of their relations. When we look at Adam Smith and at his scholarship we can 
see an example of the difference between political economy and entangled political economy.  
Adam Smith’s most famous two words are the “invisible hand.” More often than not, the invisible 
hand today is understood and presented as a claim for free market, where by free market it is 
generally implied a complete absence of political intervention in the market (Grampp 2000). This 
interpretation exposes Smith to a series of accusations or praises both from the left and from the 
right. It is often claimed that Smith does not believe in any regulation at all and this is why he 
believes in free markets. It is also often claimed that Smith believes in regulations and therefore he is 
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in favor of interventionism. These two positions seem to be irreconcilable, and are the sources of 
many debates (Viner 1927; Stigler 1971; Samuels 2011). Yet, if we use the entangled political 
economy approach, we can see why these readings of Smith may be both right and wrong. They are 
both right because it is true that Smith favors free markets, but it is also true that Smith favors 
political interventions in the market. They are both wrong because they assume Smith works with 
the same apparatus we do: that markets and state are separate and independent from each other.  
For Smith, one cannot have a functioning market without the power of the state that guarantees and 
regulates property rights and contracts. And the enforcement of contract law makes little sense in a 
context with no markets. Markets and state are both necessarily present in the analysis and 
necessarily entangled. I believe Warren Samuels (2011) is correct in describing Smith, even if in a 
different context, as presenting the following view: “The market must be seen to be qualified in its 
operation by the impact of moral and legal rules and other institutions that are themselves a matter 
of choice and evolution. … The order produced by markets can only arise if the legal and moral 
framework is operating well” (Samuels 2011, p. 47). And again: “Markets do not exist independently 
of mankind. Markets are a function of strategic actions of business people and firms, laws, and 
moral rules. Markets are like property, law, and morals: Each is simultaneously both a dependant and 
independent variable. Each, that is to say, is a function of the forces acting on and through it, and 
each influences those same forces” (Samuels 2011, p. 185). 
Understanding Smith’s analysis of the invisible hand, of the invisible hand regulating the relations 
between markets and state, in this way, as a symbiotic nexus of entangled relationships, is not far 
from Wagner’s analysis of a marina.  
A marina is an attractive place to go on vacation or just to spend a few days out of town. There are 
boats; there are restaurants, shops, hotels, piazzas. Wagner asks, for example, what determines the 
price of a hotel in that busy marina. The market? The state? Private interactions? Public interactions? 
In a sense, the answer is: all of the above. The price of the hotel is partially dependant on private 
enterprises and public enterprises, and an entangled relation of the two. The (market) price of a 
hotel is partly dependant on the quality of the (public) road that leads to it. In Wagner’s words: “For 
instance, you travel between the hotel in which you stay and the marina over roads that are built and 
maintained by governments.  Among other things, the value of the hotel and the services it offers 
depends on the quality of the roads.  Furthermore, the river on which the marina sits requires 
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periodic dredging by some government agency to prevent boats from running aground. The full set 
of activities that are undertaken within the town and its environs requires cooperation and 
coordination throughout an array of enterprises, private and public. That cooperation and 
coordination, moreover, is not that which we would recognize as a planned parade but rather 
resembles that of the divergent and interacting plans of the pedestrians passing through a piazza” 
(Wagner 2012, p. 127). Similarly, he describes a piazza with private street vendors and public 
sanitation and police. Mentioning recent work of Virgil Storr (2008), Wagner explains that the 
entanglement is unavoidable because both collective and market activities occupy the same societal 
space. 
Just like Smith, Wagner tells us that markets in isolations do not exist. Markets are intertwined with 
state activities in a way that is difficult, if not impossible to separate. In addition, Wagner notices, 
that today considering markets in isolation may be an ineffective instrument because it tends to 
ignore a large part of our social and economic interactions: “The market-based theory of societal 
coordination, however, gives only an incomplete account of the full range of societal coordination. 
The domain of that incompleteness, moreover, is surely wider now when collective activity 
comprises a third to a half of all economic activity than when it comprised less than a tenth.” 
(Wagner 2012 p. 126) 
 
Unplanned results of Entangled Profit and Power  
Another aspect of the entangled political economy we can see in Smith is the idea that the 
entanglement of the economy and polity is such that the desire for profits and the desire for power 
are knotted together, even if not always with positive consequences for society. Often the 
entanglement of economic profit and political power is difficult, if not impossible, to detangle. In 
Smith one can see that not just businesses lobby the government to expand themselves, but also that 
the government uses businesses to expand its power and the line that separate the two is blurred. 
And in all cases the results are more often than not unplanned, or, to use the sentence of Adam 




The idea of an entanglement of factors in determining social, political, and economic outcome in an 
unplanned manner is indeed one of the major contributions of the Scottish thinkers of the 18th 
century (Berry 1997). In a sense following Mandeville ([1732] 1988), Adam Smith is not dissimilar to 
Adam Ferguson ([1767] 1995), William Roberston ([1769] 1989), or John Millar ([1806] 2006) in 
their understanding of unplanned results of human interactions (Smith 2009), which Wagner brings 
back in the analysis.    
Wagner sustains that an effective arena to see the entanglements of the entangled political economy 
is a crisis: “Though we maintain that entanglement is a relevant organizing framework during all 
periods of politico-economic activity, we argue that moments of crisis are particularly useful in 
demonstrating this relevance because crisis accelerates interaction between the two orders as 
demand for political responses increases in the wake of undesirable macro-outcomes (see Higgs 
1987). Consequently, new relationships are formed across nodes as traditional boundaries are less 
respected” (Smith, Wagner, and Yandle 2011, p. 51). He uses the reactions to the 2008 crisis as an 
example. Some big businesses more or less in need enable the government to expand its powers and 
the government crave for power enables some big businesses to gain privileges.  
Adam Smith does not face nor does he describe major negative shocks to the economy. Yet, in his 
words we find major shocks to the economy. The discovery of the New World is a shock to the 
economy, even if a positive one, in most of the cases.  We can use the discovery of the New World 
as a parallel to see how it may be possible to expand the analysis that Wagner started. In this sense 
Smith’s analysis completes the analysis of entangled political economy of Smith, Wagner, Yandle 
(2011).  
In Smith, the examples of big businesses and manufacturers obtaining privileges from the 
government are numerous and well described in the literature (Evensky 2005). But what are also 
numerous are the simultaneous examples of the government using big businesses to expand its 
power. The colonial policies are an example of this complex entanglement of polity and economics. 
Basically all the colonial expansions in modern time, according to Smith, seem to be due to an 
entanglement of search for power and search for profits, from the conquests of Columbus to the 
management of the East India Company. The Crown of Spain continued funding Columbus’s 
search for Eldorado in exchange not only for half of the gold found but also for possession of the 
new territories, while Columbus seeked Spanish support for his search for profits and glory (WN 
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IV.viii.a.15, p. 51). Britain subsidized and gave privileges to the East India Company to expand its 
empire in the east as the East India Company searched for government’s protection of its privileges 
(WN IV.i.e. 26-29, pp. 746-754).  
Interestingly, Smith states that the consequences of the dynamics between the economy and the 
polity in the colonies are unplanned and unpredictable, just like Wagner suggests the consequences 
of entangled political economy tend to be. Wagner indeed claims: “As agreements are reached, 
statutes modified, and regulations written, a package of outcomes emerges that no one has chosen, 
not even senior members of the legislative and executive branches of government. Each participant 
pursues opportunities for gain within a networked system of complex interaction where the overall 
outcome is not a product of intentional choice” (Smith, Wagner, and Yandle 2011, p. 48). And 
toward the conclusion of the chapter “On the Motives for establishing new Colonies,” Smith tells us 
something quite similar: how entangled and how unpredictable the colonial power is. Indeed “A 
project of commerce to the East Indies, therefore, gave occasion to the first discovery of the West. 
A project of conquest gave occasion to the establishment of the Spaniards in those newly discovered 
countries. The motive which excited them to this conquest was a project of gold and silver mines; 
and the course of accidents, which no human wisdom could foresee, rendered this project much 
more successful than the undertakers had any reasonable ground for expecting” (WN IV.vii.b.21, p. 
564). 
While Smith is famous, correctly or not, for the positive unintended consequences of human actions 
within the economy, the unintended consequences of the entanglement of the desire for power and 
the desire for profits, of the polity and of the economy, may not always be positive. Indeed they may 
be quite negative, if not fatal. The policies resulting in the long run from the development of the 
discovery and conquest of the new world are an example of how damaging this entanglement can 
become. The following lengthy paragraph is worthy citing in full due to the power of Smith’s 
description:  
“The monopoly of the colony trade besides, by forcing towards it a much greater proportion of the 
capital of Great Britain than what would naturally have gone to it, seems to have broken altogether 
that natural balance which would otherwise have taken place among all the different branches of 
British industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of being accommodated to a great number of 
small markets, has been principally suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running in 
12 
 
a great number of small channels, had been taught to run principally in one great channel. But the 
whole system of her industry and commerce had thereby been rendered less secure; the whole state 
of her body politick less healthful, than it otherwise would have been. In her present condition, 
Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital parts are 
overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many dangerous disorders scarce incident to 
those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel, 
which had been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural 
proportion of the industry and commerce of the country had been forced to circulate, is very likely 
to bring on the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body politick. The expectation of a 
rupture with the colonies, accordingly, has struck the people of Great Britain with more terror than 
they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or a French invasion. … The blood, of which the circulation is 
stopt in some of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges itself into the greater, without occasioning any 
dangerous disorder; but when it is stopt in any of the greater vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or 
death, are the immediate and unavoidable consequences.” (WN IV.vii.c.43, pp. 604-605) 
Smith’s analysis is parallel to Wagner’s when Wagner notices that: “On a conceptual level, Jane 
Jacobs (1992) describes societal processes that evolve through interaction between institutional 
carriers of two distinct moralities, which she describes as the commercial and the guardian moral 
syndromes. A central feature of her analysis is the treatment of some of the debilitating qualities of 
certain patterns of entanglement, and which she describes as “monstrous moral hybrids” (Smith, 
Wagner, and Yandle 2011, p. 48). 
 
Entangled law: Stage Theory as a Theory of Entanglement 
Let us now look at how Smith analyzes the interaction between the economy and other systems of 
behaviors. Let us start from how Smith describes the interaction of the law and the economy. Here 
again, the relations are complex and not unidirectional. Following Montesquieu ([1748] 1989) and 
possibly Voltaire ([1733] 1999) and followed by Millar ([1806] 2006), Adam Smith tells us that, as 
societies develop more complex social and economic ties, their legal systems also increase in 
complexity (Berry 1997; Smith 2006). In different stages of development, “the laws and regulations 
with regard to property must be very different” (LJ: 1.33, p. 16). 
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A nomadic population will not need a complex legal system, and especially not a complex legal 
system based on property law like one would need in a society where commerce is the predominant 
form for the generation of wealth. There is not much private property in a nomadic economy, while 
there is lots of it in a commercial economy. A commercial society, with complex and multiform 
needs to transfer property, will have a more complex legal system based on property law and on the 
transfer of property (Berry 1997). 
In the earliest stages of economic development, Smith indeed tells us, “[f]ew laws or regulations will 
(be) requisite …, and these will not extend to nay great length, or be very rigorous in the 
punishments annexed to any infringement of property” (LJ: 1.33, p. 16). But “when flocks and herds 
come to be reared property then becomes of a very considerable extent; there are many 
opportunities of injuring one another and such injuries are extremely pernicious to the sufferer. In 
this state many more laws and regulations much take place; theft and robbery being easily 
committed, will of consequences be punished with the utmost rigor. In the age of agriculture, they 
are not perhaps so much exposed to theft and open robbery, but then there are many ways in which 
property may be interrupted as the subjects of it are considerably extended. The laws therefore tho 
perhaps not so rigorous will be of a far greater number than amongst a nation of shepherds. In the 
age of commerce, as the subjects of property are greatly increased the laws must be proportionally 
multiplied. The more improved any society is and the greater length the several [sic] means of 
supporting the inhabitants are carried, the greater will be the number of their laws and regulations 
necessary to maintain justice, and prevent infringements of the right of property”  (LJ: 1.33-4, p. 16) 
 The stage of economic development has, for Smith, shaped the development of the legal system. 
But what is interesting is that the analysis Smith gives us does not stop here. While it is true that an 
economic system affects its legal system it is also true that a legal system affects its economic system. 
It is a complex entangled relationship that shapes the actual condition of a society. 
Historically, the advent of commerce and commercial society brought about good governance and a 
fully developed legal system. But at the same time, the stability of the legal system allowed for 
commercial societies to flourish (WN III). 
The most striking example of this entangled interrelation between the economy and the law is 
Smith’s analysis of the three different kind of economic systems: the stationary, the progressive, and 
the declining economic systems. What characterizes each system is its level of economic growth. 
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Smith uses the state of population growth as a proxy to evaluate economic growth. For Smith, it is 
the legal system that helps determining each economic state, more than the natural resources, or the 
technology available, or other natural variables. The law is entangled with the economy so that 
economy may affect the law but at the same time the law plays a major role in determining the 
economic conditions.  
China is “one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and 
most populous countries in the world,” (WN I.viii.24, 89) but its laws are oppressive. Its population 
and its economy stagnate. The American colonies on the other hand are blessed with the “genius of 
the British constitution” (WN I.viii.26, 91) and have an expanding economy and population. So 
much so that a widower with several children is “frequently courted as a sort of fortune” (WN 
I.viii.23, 88) and is able to remarry immediately because her children are considered a valuable asset. 
Bengal, on the other hand, is the tragic example of the effects of bad laws on the economy. Bengal 
succumbed to mercantilist law which promoted monopolistic trade. Bengal, a fertile land which can 
support a large population sees a continuous population decline due to famine: “[Bengal is] a fertile 
country which had before been much depopulated, where subsistence, consequently, should not be 
very difficult, and where, notwithstanding, three or four hundred thousand people die of hunger in 




The economy for Smith, like any other system that motivates human behavior, generates a complex 
nexus of relations because of its interactions with other systems such as morality. Smith shows us 
the economy affects morality and at the same time morality affects the economy in a complex 
interactive way. Smith, like (Montesquieu [1748] 1989), but not identically, believes in the doux 
commerce, that is that commerce softens the spirits of people, making them more humane and 
compassionate. So for example, the development of commerce enables the abandonment of the 
practice of infanticide because it grows to be considered morally repugnant (WN intro.4, 10 and 
WN I.viii.24, 90). The development of commerce enables also honesty to flourish and to become a 
habit. “Whenever commerce is introduced into any country, probity and punctuality always 
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accompany it. These virtues in a rude and barbarous country are almost unknown. Of all the nations 
in Europe, the Dutch, the most commercial, are the most faithfull to their word. The English are 
more so than the Scotch, but much inferiour to the Dutch, and in the remote parts of this country 
they <are> far less so than in the commercial parts of it. […] A dealer is afraid of losing his 
character, and is scrupulous in observing every engagement. When a person makes perhaps 
20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the 
very appearance of a cheat would make him lose. Where people seldom deal with one another, we 
find that they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they 
can lose by the injury which it does their character. […] When the greater part of people are 
merchants they always bring probity and punctuality into fashion, and these therefore are the 
principal virtues of a commercial nation”(LJ (B) 326-328, p. 538-539). This lays out enabling 
conditions for economic development and growth. Yet, the prosperity now generated may in its turn 
generate perverse incentives, which in their turn would hinder economic development and growth. 
 Smith tells us indeed that large profit opportunities, such as the ones emerging from the 
government granting monopoly powers to some merchants in commercial societies, generate 
incentives for immoral behaviors which in their turn generate economic consequences which 
happen to be degenerative and destructive for the economy. Some big merchants and 
manufacturers, attracted by the rents that the government offers, disregard morality to increase their 
profits thanks to the establishment and the maintenance of monopolistic privileges (Paganelli 2009). 
For Smith: “to hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no other purpose but 
to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which 
the sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjects” (WN IV.viii.30, p. 654). But this is 
exactly what the government monopolies give incentives to do. Merchants behave in a unjust way 
because “the interest of the home-consumer had been sacrificed to that of the producer … a great 
empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of customers who should be 
obliged to buy from the shops of our different producers, all the goods with which these could 
supply them. For the sake of that little enhancement of price which this monopoly might afford our 
produces, the home-consumers have been burdened with the whole expense of maintaining and 
defending that empire” (WN IV.viii.53, p. 661).  
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The entanglement of (im)morality and economy generates cruelty as Smith explains: “But the 
cruelest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison of some of 
those which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers had extorted from the legislature, for 
the support of their own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws may 
be said to be all written in blood” (WN IV.viii.17, 648), as well as causing disruption to an 
unplanned extent. 
We can learn from Smith, therefore, that economy and morality are entangled in a complex nexus of 
relationships. The economic conditions may affect the moral code just like a moral code may affect 
the economic conditions of the individual and society and their relationship may not be a simple one 
It may not be by accident that recent works on the morality of markets, that is of the complex of 
interactions and mutual influences between markets and morality, are done by scholars (such as 
Yandle 1983, McCloskey 2006, Zak and Jensen 2008) who are deep admires of Adam Smith.  
 
Conclusions:       
Entangled political economy is an approach to analyzing the relations between polity and economy 
which implies a complex nexus of relations between the two spheres or human behaviors. Looking 
at Adam Smith helps expand this approach and see its potentials for explaining human behaviors 
and institutions.  
Smith integrates the current literature which presents an analysis of a negative shock to society and 
by looking at how the economy is entangled with the polity. Adam Smith also adds the possibility of 
seeing the unintended consequences of the complex nexus of interactions of polity and economy in 
a positive shock to society, such as the discovery and conquest of the New World. Smith offers the 
understanding that the economy is entangled not only with the polity, but also with the law, and 
with morals. For Smith the relation between the economy and the other systems that affect human 
conduct is a complex one, based on several simultaneous layers of interactions. So when we wish to 
understand political economy we should consider that the economy interacts with the polity and 
also, simultaneously, with the law and with morality.  
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Using Smith to expand the understanding of an entangled political economy helps us understanding 
human behavior which therefore implies studying not just these different systems independently 
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